Address to SEC and Financial Reporting Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, May 13, 1986: the National Commitssion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting -  a first trimester report by Treadway, James C.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection 
1986 
Address to SEC and Financial Reporting Institute at the University 
of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, May 13, 1986: the 
National Commitssion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting - a first 
trimester report 
James C. Treadway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
 WASHINGTON RELATED  MATTERS -ITEM 3
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Chairman




William M. Batten 
Chairman (Retired)
New York Stock Exchange
William S. Kanaga 
Chairman (Retired)
Arthur Young & Company





1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 659-5640
Thomas I. Storrs 
Chairman of the Board (Retired) 
NCNB Corporation
Donald H. Trautlein 









SEC and Financial Reporting Institute 
at the University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 
May 13, 1986
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING - A FIRST
TRIMESTER REPORT
James C. Treadway, Jr
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING —  A FIRST
TRIMESTER REPORT
One-Third The Way There
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting is 
about one-third the way home. After approximately six months of 
work, the Commission has finished its first trimester, one which saw 
the generation of numerous research projects, lively and free 
exchanges among the members of the Commission on any number of 
topics, and several presentations to the Commission by outside 
experts.
Between now and Summer's end, the Commission will receive and 
analyze various third party research projects, as well as internal 
research projects, and prepare for major Commission meetings in 
September and October. At those meetings, the Commission will make 
final decisions on numerous issues, which in turn will provide the 
basis for our staff to prepare an exposure draft of the Commission's 
Report.
After approval by the Commission, the exposure draft will be 
distributed for public comment after the first of the year. The 
comment period will last ninety days, and we hope to analyze and 
react to the comments and publish the Report in final form at the 
end of another ninety days.
Commission Objectives
Those who have followed the Commission’s work may recall that 
our fundamental charge is to analyze the whys and wherefores of, and 
propose solutions to, fraudulent financial reporting —  a fairly 
modest undertaking. Some might ask what realistic chance we have 
for making a positive contribution. After all, the AICPA, FASB,
SEC, Blue Sky Commissioners, hard-nosed prosecutors, honest corpo­
rate executives, strong-minded auditors, Congressional committees, 
and independent directors have not, individually or in concert, been 
able to eliminate fraudulent financial reporting. Some might even 
question whether any rational basis whatsoever exists for optimism 
on our part.
Although my views are tinged with caution, I believe we have 
reason for optimism. First, our Commissioners are all practical 
people with much experience. Their many combined years of experi­
ence and insights bring together substantial judgment, plus differ­
ent perspectives and disciplines. Second, the Commission is ap­
proaching fraudulent financial reporting as a multi-dimensional 
problem, based on our belief that many factors contribute and that 
the multiple causal influences must be identified and addressed to 
provide hope for any degree of success. Third, we operate under no 
illusion that our Report will, once and for all, magically banish 
fraudulent financial reporting in its many forms and colorations.
The problem of fraudulent financial reporting does not lend itself 
to simple answers —  the activity is as complex as human nature
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itself, with all its quirks, foibles, and eccentricities. Fourth, 
and perhaps the converse of having no illusions of granduer, success 
does not require that we solve all the problems. Rather, success to 
a large extent lies in identifying and airing the issues —  the 
causal influences —  thereby setting the Stage for further consider­
ation of ways to deal with those influences.
With those thoughts firmly in mind —  particularly that fraudu­
lent financial reporting must be approached as a multi-dimensional 
problem —  let’s explore the Commission’s approach. Early on, as 
the Commission attempted to determine its approach and methodology, 
we found ourselves asking a number of questions. What causes 
fraudulent financial reporting? What internal corporate pressures 
contribute? What individual shortcomings come into play? What 
failings of private corporations and of corporate governance con­
tribute? What broader societal and economic pressures are influen­
tial? What inadequacies of governmental regulations have an impact?
The mere exercise of asking these questions quickly caused the 
Commission to conclude the obvious —  that many factors, players and 
pressures contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. If that is 
so, then many ways should exist which have potential for reducing 
fraudulent financial reporting. Concentration on only one, or a 
few, causes/solutions might be valuable, but "miss the big picture." 
Someone has described efforts like ours as handling a big balloon.
If you push too hard on one side, it bulges out on the other. An 
even-handed, even-pressured approach preserves the proper shape.
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The Focus
So where did the Commission focus —  on what players, what 
factors, what influences? First, the Commission focused on manage­
ment. After all, management has both the initial and final respon­
sibility for accurate financial statements. As the Commission 
focused on management's role, many questions that quickly emerged 
turned out to be corporate governance issues.
The Audit Committee was a predictable focus, and we have spent 
much time on that issue. Questions raised thus far, without any 
definitive positions being taken, include:
1. Should Audit Committees be mandatory for all 
publicly-owned corporations? Or for any group of 
companies?
2. Should Audit Committees have greater powers? If so, 
what?
3. Since no source prescribes the powers of the Audit 
Committee, should we try to create a list of powers 
and responsibilities?
4. Should the role of Audit Committees be more visible 
and better communicated to the public? Would it be a 
positive development, for example, if the Chairman of 
the Audit Committee included in the Annual Report to 
Stockholders his own letter describing the activities 
of the Audit Committee?
5. Should the Audit Committee's interface with the 
internal audit department, and its involvement with 
and attention to internal controls, be more publi­
cized?
Those are but a few of the corporate governance issues the 
Commission has discussed, all relating to the Audit Committee. But 
I emphasize that the Commission is interested in these —  and all
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other —  topics only as they relate to or have potential for reduc­
ing fraudulent financial reporting. We are not embarked on an 
effort to overhaul corporate governance generally.
Beyond Audit Committees but still loosely in the corporate 
governance arena, the Commission also has looked at corporate 
structure, environment, and atmosphere. You could call it the
 
corporate culture. Again, however, I emphasize that our look is 
sharply focused —  how does corporate culture relate to, encourage 
or tolerate, or discourage or prevent, fraudulent financial report­
ing. In that area, the Commission has considered, e.g.:
1. Do certain management techniques —  such as management by 
objective and decentralized operations —  lend themselves 
to abuses more readily than others?
2. Should more formalized procedures generally be followed by 
everyone involved in the financial reporting process? If 
so, what are they?
3. Rather than attempting to prescribe new procedures, should 
the Commission instead focus on other approaches, such as 
more required disclosure about internal controls and 
procedures?
4. Should corporate management be required to express an 
opinion on the adequacy of internal controls —  an idea 
once proposed by the SEC but later abandoned?
5. Is the tone and atmosphere set at the top the most influ­
ential factor? If the tone set at the top is fuzzy, are 
all other controls and procedures predestined to be 
ineffective? Can our Commission influence that tone?
6. To what extent should the Commission encourage or propose 
corporate codes of conduct or ethics?
The Commission has spent much time on internal controls and the 
role of the internal auditor. That focus involves, at least
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potentially, some issues of corporate governance and of corporate 
structure and function. In each meeting, regardless of our agenda, 
we seem to come back to internal controls.
Beyond management, the other most visible player in financial 
reporting is the independent public accountant —  a highly predict­
able focus of the Commission. When considering the independent 
accountant, we find no shortage of issues. Professionalism and its 
possible decline is one. Beyond the general debate about "profes­
sionalism," the Commission has focused upon competition and opinion 
shopping, the SEC’s Request For Comments on Opinion Shopping, the 
Auditing Standards Board’s decision to tackle the same issue, and 
the steady debate about auditors’ ability and obligation to detect
fraud.
The Commission also has focused on the accounting profession's 
existing regulatory and enforcement mechanism and proposals for 
change, as well as upon public concern about the potential impact of 
non-audit services on auditor independence. But, as I said in 
reference to management and corporate governance, and I emphasize 
again, our focus on these and all issues is narrow. How do they 
relate to fraudulent financial reporting, if at all? Would changes 
reduce incidents of fraudulent financial reporting or otherwise 
lessen the potential for its occurrence? We are not interested in 
these issues as broad policy issues, as interesting as they may be. 
Only if we were to determine that some change in the profession’s 
self-regulatory structure or in the scope of services provided would
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lessen the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting would we have 
any basis for comment.
After management and the auditor, law enforcement may be the 
next most significant factor. The Commission therefore has and will 
continue to address the effectiveness of the regulatory and law 
enforcement environment in dealing with fraudulent financial report­
ing. Is it good, bad or indifferent? Is the regulatory and law 
enforcement environment the real issue? Is more "regulation in 
advance" the answer? Can law enforcement realistically do more than 
discipline a few truly egregious violators?
Law enforcement considerations inevitably take us to penalties 
and sanctions —  a long-running, sometimes highly emotional debate. 
In that vein, the Commission has discussed issues such as:
1. Are sanctions generally adequate? Do they deter?
2. Is the injunction a stiff sanction or a meaningless wrist 
slap?
3. Are more criminal prosecutions and longer sentences for 
white collar crime the answer?
4. If law enforcement and regulation are to be encouraged, 
what about the effectiveness of self-regulatory organiza­
tions in the enforcement area? How effective are the 
enforcement mechanisms of private professional groups?




From the outset —  given the Commission’s multi-dimensional 
approach —  reliance on third-parties for research assistance and 
input has been a necessity. As we receive third-party research 
efforts, they will be analyzed, digested, and perhaps refined.
While some of these research efforts may gather information which is 
broader than our narrow focus, we intend to confine our Report, 
again, to fraudulent financial reporting. Take any of the areas I 
have talked about, corporate governance, for example. Our Commis­
sion has neither the time, capacity, nor inclination to do a compre­
hensive study of that issue. Our focus of necessity must be sharp. 
Is there something about corporate governance, some aspect of it, 
that relates directly to fraudulent financial reporting?
With those cautionary words about our research efforts, here is 
a list of outside research projects.
Impact of Professionalism and Codes of Conduct on Financial
Reporting.
Financial Reporting in the U.S. and the Role of the SEC.
The Independent Auditing Profession’s Response to Fraudulent
Financial Reporting.
How to Introduce the Issue of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
to College Business Students.
Expansion of Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence.
Surprise Write-Offs.
How Internal Controls Can Help In Prevention and Detection of
Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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Role of the Internal Audit Function in Prevention and Detec­
tion of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures Contributing 
to Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Corporate Structure/Governance and Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting.
In addition, the Commission's staff will be conducting inter­
nal research projects on the following topics.
Analysis of SEC Cases. (A database of approximately 200 cases 
has been partially complied and awaits analysis. Analysis 
will includes review of prior studies, including work done by 
the Cohen Commission? analysis of 200 cases looking for any 
patterns and common characteristics? and in-depth analysis of 
4-6 cases.)
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures within CPA
Firms. (A study of the forces and pressures generally experi­
enced by members of the audit team that may contribute to 
breakdowns in audit quality. The purpose is not to reinvent 
the Cohen Commission's study on budget pressure, but rather to 
gain a broader understanding of the behavioral dynamics that 
operate in administration of typical audit engagements. Among 
other goals, this study will evaluate SAS No. 22 —  Planning 
and Supervision.)
Opinion-Shopping and Competition. (This study will analyze 
conflicting viewpoints surrounding the practice of opinion 
shopping and attempt to relate these findings to the more 
general issue of competition in public accounting.)
Reporting on Financial Condition. (This study will explore the 
feasibility of the independent auditor's assuming increased 
responsibility for evaluating and reporting on going-concern 
problems.)
Red Flag Checklist. (This study will compile an inventory of 
red flags from existing sources, other work of the Commission, 
and risk analysis questionnaires of public accounting firms 
and explore how this information can be used to prevent 
fraudulent financial reporting.)
Second Partner Reviews. (This study will gather information 
about second partner reviews in public accounting firms and 
explore the feasibility of standards being established by the 
Auditing Standards Board.)
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Self-Regulation of Public Accounting Profession. (This study 
will consider the regulatory environment in which public 
accountants perform audits and consider alternatives.)
Quality Control Standards. (This study will evaluate the 
existing guidance provided by quality control standards.)
Analytical Review/Operational Audit Procedures. (This study 
will explore the usefulness of analytical review and opera­
tional audit procedure in detecting fraud.)
Fraudulent Financial Reporting Framework. (This study will 
evaluate the available literature on white collar crime to the 
area of fraudulent financial reporting.)
Fraud Taxonomy. (This study will attempt to classify various 
fraudulent acts and refine the concepts and terminology 
surrounding fraud.)
Related Studies. (This project will gather information about 
similar fraud initiatives going on in other countries.)
Guidelines for Audit Committees. (This study will attempt to 
develop guidance as to the role of audit committees.)
Financial Reporting Process. (This study will attempt to 
describe the financial reporting process, including its key 
components and interrelationships, and explain how the integ­
rity of this process is compromised by acts of fraud.,
Legal Environment. (This study will attempt to describe how 
the legal system relates to and can impact fraudulent finan­
cial reporting.)
Possible Report
If you have followed my meanderings, you have a possible 
outline for a Report. And, in fact, the Commission has tentatively 
decided that the Report will have chapters or sections along the 
following lines:
1. Introduction and Goals.
2. Environmental and Individual Forces and Pressures and 
their Implications for Preventing, Discouraging, or 
Encouraging Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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3. Professionalism.
4. Effectiveness of Regulatory and Law Enforcement Agencies.
5. Corporate Structure and Governance.
6. Independent and Internal Auditing.
7. Conclusions, Models, Recommendations.
Thus far, I have spoken about the affirmative —  what the 
Commission will do and be. Let’s turn to the flip side —  what the 
Commission will not be. The Commission is not attempting to be all 
things to all men. It will not be a prosecutor of any specific 
corporation; an accounting standards setter; a drafter of specific 
legislation or regulatory agency rules; an auditing standards 
setter, other than perhaps in the most limited fashion; an investi­
gator of all business practices that any segment of society finds 
objectionable; or a panacea —  the ultimate, self-contained answer 
to all financial reporting and disclosure evils.
Conclusion
Any effort such as ours causes those who are involved to 
reflect periodically on the conclusion of the project, particularly 
that result which others might label a success. In thinking about 
success, I suggest that success -- like the problem of fraudulent 
financial reporting —  of necessity is composed of many elements. 
They include:
11
1. The Report must contain a balanced analysis and addressing 
of the issues.
2. A second determinant will be whether the Report provides a 
basis for other private, public, and professional groups 
to go further in certain areas —  whether it becomes a 
springboard for others to pursue matters in more depth.
3. Success also will be measured by whether the Commission 
raises levels of sensitivity and creates a heightened 
awareness among all —  corporate management, the account­
ing profession, regulatory agencies, and the public —  
about the financial reporting process and the particular 
elusive problem of fraudulent financial reporting.
4. Practical guidance will be a major element of success.
For example, can the Commission identify common patterns 
among companies that go astray? Can we characterize and 
catalogue those patterns? Can the Commission go so far as 
to suggest a model which has the maximum potential for 
minimizing the incidence of fraudulent financing report­
ing?
Thank you for your attention.
* * * * * * *
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